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Note - The Synthetic Biology Revolution: 
Mapping A Future Research Agenda 
DAVID LEARY 
Abstract 
Synthetic biology represents a startling and perhaps revolutionary 
development in the biosciences with significant implications for the 
future of biotechnology and its interface with international environmental 
law. This article identifies the challenges the synthetic biology revolution 
poses for international environmental law and sets out key research 
questions for the future. The note opens by first examining how synthetic 
biology differs from GMO’s and provides a brief insight into the current 
scale of research and development relating to synthetic biology and the 
focus of its recent developments. Beyond that the article then goes on to 
highlight some of the key environmental risks associated with this 
revolutionary technology. The note examines the emerging debates 
surrounding synthetic biology in the forums associated with the 1992 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. Finally, the note 
concludes with a brief comment on the need for responses shaped under 
international environmental law to also be linked to developments in 
other areas of law especially laws dealing with weapons proliferation and 
terrorism. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Synthetic biology represents a startling and perhaps revolutionary 
development in the biosciences with significant implications for the 
future of biotechnology and its interface with international environmental 
law. At a simplistic level, the concept of synthetic biology boils down to 
one key hypothesis: that life or the components of life can be designed on 
a computer, chemically made in the laboratory and then transplanted into 
cells to create new life forms. The profound possibilities of this 
technology were most vividly demonstrated in 2010 when researchers at 
the J Craig Venter Institute announced ‘the successful construction of the 
first self-replicating, synthetic bacterial cell’; that they had ‘synthesised 
the 1.08 million base-pair chromosome of a modified Mycoplasma 
mycoides genome’; and that this was ‘the proof of principle that genomes 
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can be designed in silico (in the computer), chemically produced in the 
laboratory and transplanted into a recipient cell to produce a new self-
replicating cell controlled only by the synthetic genome.’
1
  
Synthetic biology is far more complex than just this one scientific claim. 
It does appear that synthetic biology is a totally new area of biological 
research and involves fundamentally different techniques from those used 
in creating genetically modified organisms (GMOs). These revolutionary 
developments in the biosciences and the biotechnology industry are only 
just beginning to be understood in policy and legal circles. There has in 
fact been little analysis of the legal implications of synthetic biology in 
terms of the potential implications for the environment.  
This note presents a preliminary sketch of some of the key legal issues 
relating to synthetic biology and emerging responses under international 
environmental law. It does not aim to be a definitive analysis of the 
challenges posed, nor does it purport to offer a comprehensive or 
preferred model for a response to these challenges. Rather, it seeks to 
alert environmental lawyers to these challenges and map out a research 
agenda for this issue into the future.  
The note proceeds in part II by first examining how synthetic biology 
differs from GMO’s and provides a brief insight into the current scale of 
research and development relating to synthetic biology and the focus of 
its recent developments. Part III then goes on to highlight some of the key 
environmental risks associated with this revolutionary technology. Part 
IV then examines the emerging debates surrounding synthetic biology in 
the forums associated with 1992 United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity.
2
 The note concludes with a brief comment on the 
need for responses shaped under international environmental law to also 
be linked to developments in other areas of law, especially laws dealing 
with weapons proliferation and terrorism.  
II HOW IS SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY DIFFERENT FROM GMO’S? 
Synthetic biology comprises the purposeful creation of totally new 
organisms piece by piece.
3
 By contrast, GMOs are produced by 
transferring individual genes from one species to another. In a recent 
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study prepared for the European Commission, synthetic biology was 
described as: 
engineering of biology: the synthesis of complex, biologically-based (or 
inspired) systems which display functions that do not exist in nature. This 
engineering approach may be applied at all levels of the hierarchy of 




The US Presidential Commission on the Study of Bioethical Issues 
explained synthetic biology in the following terms: 
Synthetic biology is the name given to an emerging field of research that 
combines elements of biology, engineering, genetics, chemistry, and 
computer science. The diverse but related endeavors that fall under its 
umbrella rely on chemically synthesized DNA, along with standardized 
and automatable processes, to create new biochemical systems or 
organisms with novel or enhanced characteristics. Whereas standard 
biology treats the structure and chemistry of living things as natural 
phenomena to be understood and explained, synthetic biology treats 
biochemical processes, molecules, and structures as raw materials and 
tools to be used in novel and potentially useful ways, often quite 
independent of their natural roles. It joins the knowledge and techniques 
of biology with the practical principles and techniques of engineering. 
“Bottom-up” synthetic biologists, those in the very earliest stages of 
research, seek to create novel biochemical systems and organisms from 
scratch, using nothing but chemical reagents. “Top-down” synthetic 
biologists, who have been working for several decades, treat existing 
organisms, genes, enzymes, and other biological materials as parts or 
tools to be reconfigured for purposes chosen by the investigator.
5
 
This new approach has emerged as a consequence of rapid developments 
in genomics, a field of science which results from ‘a marriage of 
molecular and cell biology with classical genetics’ and computing 
science.
6
 This is different from more traditional approaches to 
biotechnology research, development and commercialisation over recent 
decades. Historical developments in international environmental law have 
been premised on the assumption that biotechnology research and 
development followed a predictable and linear process: scientists 
collected samples of wild genetic resources in the field, returned these 
samples to their laboratories where they were systematically screened for 
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possible leads for new developments in biotechnology.
7
 New drugs and 
(other products) were developed subsequently, through a process of trial 
and error.  
While these assumptions underlie much of the current international 
environmental law, in reality biotechnology research, development and 
commercialisation is a far more complex process. 
Since the mid-1980s the emergence of revolutionary technologies such as 
gene sequencing and database mining driven by the power of 
bioinformatics enabled rapid screening of possible leads and hence major 
developments in biotechnology.
8
 This new era of collective intelligence
9
 
is characterised by the sharing of data through massive online databases.
10
 
Access to data and computing is now integral to biotechnology research, 
development and commercialisation, and is fast eclipsing access to 




Synthetic genomics takes the marriage of biology and computing beyond 
simply understanding molecular and cell biology. It makes it possible to 
actually construct the building blocks of life from scratch. As Garfinkel 
and Friedman have explained, synthetic genomics is a ‘set of technologies 
that make it possible to construct a molecule of DNA of any specified 
sequence and nearly any length, up to the size of a whole genome.’
12
 
Through the assembly of DNA molecules, individual genes, 
chromosomes and even whole genomes can be created.
13
 This opens the 
possibility of redesigning existing organisms and even the ‘de novo 
design and 'programming' of genes and organisms.’
14
  
As an emerging field there are several different approaches, but the most 
dominant of these borrows heavily from the engineering concept of 
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modularity, which suggests that all complex living entities can be broken 
down into their respective component functional modules.
15
 For the 
biosciences an approach premised on modularity suggests that if 
biologically complex organisms can be broken down into their constituent 
modules, then in theory, they can be reassembled as totally novel 
biological structures and ultimately life forms.  
As Calvert has observed, such an approach  
not only makes biological complexity easier to deal with, but also makes 




III THE FOCUS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY R&D IN THE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTOR 
The science of synthetic biology is gradually being incorporated into 
mainstream biotechnology research and commercial development. There 
has been a significant increase in entities conducting research relating to 
synthetic biology from 2009 to 2013.
17
 A total of 508 unique entities 
conducting research on synthetic biology have been identified globally 
including more than 192 biotechnology companies and 204 universities 
across the world.
18
 Much of this research and development is occurring at 
universities, government research institutions and military laboratories in 
the USA and Europe.
19
 There is also a growing body of research and 
development occurring in countries such as Japan, China, India, Israel, 
South Africa, Brazil and Australia.
20
 Corporate entities involved in 
synthetic biology research and development globally include drug 
manufacturers Merck Serono (a division of the Merck Group of 
companies), industrial companies such as Goodyear Tyre and Rubber, 
University research spin off and small scale biotech start-up companies.
21
 
Areas of interest for large scale research and development overseas have 
included the development of ‘new biological production techniques for 
existing or novel biological materials and chemicals, including food 
ingredients and biofuels’ as well as ‘new and improved diagnostics, drugs 
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and vaccines.’
22
 A key focus in the later is on developing new treatments 
for diabetes and malaria.
23
 One of the most advanced areas is 
synthetically engineering an alternative to Artemisinin – a naturally 
occurring anti-malarial drug. In 2011 drug manufacturer Sanofi began 
large scale manufacture of semi-synthetic artemisinin in Italy.
24
 The 
production of this drug using the techniques of synthetic biology is 
expected to reduce the costs of manufacturing by a factor of 10.
25
 Other 
areas of ongoing research include the development of new tools for 
bioremediation and biosensors for use in areas such as detecting 
contamination in drinking water.
26
 
IV MANAGING SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY RISKS: CURRENT 
REGULATORY APPROACHES  
Synthetic biology has raised a series of social, ethical, philosophical, 
theological and moral issues which a significant body of academic 
literature has already engaged with.
27
 This is due in large part to the way 
this technology has the potential to challenge entrenched philosophical 
‘distinctions between, amongst others, life and non-life, the natural and 
the artificial, the evolved and the designed, and even the material and the 
informational’ leading inevitably to accusations that researchers are 
playing god or even ‘treading in Frankenstein’s footsteps’.
28
 Extending 
Foucault’s work on biopolitics, legal scholars have already made valuable 




While intellectually these debates are interesting and will continue, this 
aspect of synthetic biology has already been widely canvassed in the 
academic literature.
30
 There is also an extensive body of literature that 
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deals with the implications of synthetic biology for intellectual property 
rights.
31
 In contrast, studies of risks posed to biosafety, human health and 
biodiversity have largely been lacking and demand closer attention. 
Lawyers, and environmental lawyers in particular, should now focus on 
the practical challenges and potential risks to biosafety, human health and 
biodiversity which are posed by developments in synthetic biology. 
Most obviously, concerns have been raised that synthetic organisms could 
escape from a research laboratory or containment facility and cause 
damage to the environment or threaten human or animal health.
32
 It is 
foreseeable that a synthetic microorganism developed for a particular 
purpose might also cause harmful side effects when deliberately released 
into the environment.
33
 Also as Bhutkar has suggested,
34
 ‘[a]ny genetic 
exchange between a synthetic biological entity and a naturally occurring 
biological entity would result in natural genome contamination.’
35
 
Internationally there is an emerging debate as to whether existing 
regulation of biotechnology can adequately respond to the environmental 
concerns raised in relation to synthetic biology, and in particular whether 
it is caught by the current regulation. However, the literature that has 
examined the potential environmental and biosafety risks to date has 
come almost exclusively from the scientific community and has not 
benefited from robust legal analysis.  
For example, one of the most widely cited studies so far which examines 
regulatory options for synthetic biology was written by scientists active in 
synthetic biology research with close links to the J Craig Venter 
Institute.
36
 Most of these have indicated a series of options for 
governance with an emphasis on self-regulation. Implicit in a preference 
for self-regulation is the assumption that existing regulatory frameworks 
for biotechnology already function effectively to manage risks. A second 
assumption is that biotechnology involving synthetic biology is 
essentially the same as other forms of biotechnology. Therefore if 
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existing regulation works for other areas there is no need to consider 
further regulatory or legislative intervention.  
No detailed study has considered whether existing international 
regulation does effectively manage these risks. The studies that do exist 
are exclusively focussed on the North American or European domestic 
contexts and have lacked sufficient detailed legal analysis. For example, 
the US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
established by President Obama noted the existence of a ‘patchwork 
quilt’ of regulatory measures in the United States, but called for a ‘more 
comprehensive review’ to be undertaken to ensure these measures are 
adequate into the future.
37
  
Similarly the European Academies Science Advisory Council has 
recommended that the European Commission consider the need for 
regulatory reform in light of developments in synthetic biology.
38
 
Likewise the OECD Working Party on Biotechnology is currently 
looking at governance and regulatory structures for biotechnology 
including the role of synthetic biology ‘in the bio-economy, the necessary 
infrastructure and challenges to its development’.
39
 
V THE EMERGING DEBATE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
There has been little consideration of the relevance of international 
environmental law to addressing concerns associated with synthetic 
biology, but what debate there has been has largely been confined to 
considering the relevance of the 1992 United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity
40
 (‘CBD’) and its associated protocols. 
The CBD and, more recently, its 2010 Nagoya Protocol
41
 explicitly 
recognise the important role biodiversity has played in the development 
of biotechnology by acknowledging the sovereignty of nation states over 
their genetic resources and in its recognition of the importance of the 
conservation and sustainable use of the components of biodiversity. A 
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key feature of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol is the way it regulates 
access to such resources and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.  
Subsequent to the adoption of the CBD, the Conference of Parties of the 
CBD adopted the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity
42
 (‘Cartagena Protocol’) and the Nagoya-Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
43
 (‘Supplementary Biosafety Protocol’).  
The Cartagena Protocol grew out of the emergence of GMO’s which 
arose from the application of new scientific research and development 
techniques in biotechnology research, development and 
commercialisation. As Sands notes the emergence of GMO’s raised 
significant challenges for the regulation of biotechnology and in 
particular the  
appropriate balance to be struck between the objectives of ensuring, on 
the one hand, that developments in the field of biotechnology do not cause 
adverse effects for human health and the environment and, on the other 
hand, that new international regulatory arrangements do not place undue 
limits on the development, dissemination and use of biotechnology.
44
 
This is precisely the same balancing act that must be weighed up when 
considering synthetic biology. Today the transformative potential of 
synthetic biology to our lives and the world is in its infancy. But 
policymakers need to effectively balance management of risks to 
biosafety, human health and the environment with a regulatory 
environment that encourages innovation in the growing global 
biotechnology sector. 
The existing international law embodied in the Cartagena Protocol seeks 
to strike a balance between these two objectives by ensuring an adequate 
level of regulation of potential adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, and risks to human health during 
the trans-boundary movement of GMO’s across international borders. It 
does this by prescribing a regulatory regime relating to the safe transfer, 
handling and use of GMO’s based on an advanced informed agreement 
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procedure, which governs the trans-boundary movement and intentional 
introduction into the environment of the recipient state.
45
  
However, it is unclear to what extent both the CBD and the Cartagena 
Protocol apply to synthetic biology. Oldham, Hall and Burton
46
 have 
highlighted six key issues that warrant further detailed study including: 
 the implications of the increased reliance on digital information 
and the ease by which it can transmitted, reproduced and 
manipulated in biotechnology research, and what this may mean 
for the future relevance of the access and benefit sharing 
provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and the impact 
this may have on developing countries; 
 the relevance of the precautionary principle embedded in the 
CBD and the Cartagena Protocol; 
 problems with the application of the Cartagena Protocol, given 
scientific techniques involved in synthetic biology research and 
development in the context of biotechnology development fall 
outside the scope of the definition of ‘modern biotechnology’ in 
Article 3(i) of Cartagena Protocol, and therefore outside of the 
definition of ‘living modified organism’ under Article 3(g); 
 the fact that the Cartagena Protocol does not apply to material or 
digital transfers of genetic sequences, components and parts, 
particularly important as biotechnology research and 
development is increasingly dependent on data and computing 
technology; 
 the extent to which the various mechanisms, such as the waiver 
mechanism associated with advanced informed consent 
procedure relating to trans boundary movements of GMO’s 
under Article 6.2 of the Cartagena Protocol and the 
Supplementary Biosafety Protocol apply or not to synthetic 
organisms; and finally, 
 whether these concerns justify an immediate moratorium on the 
environmental release of synthetic organisms.
47
 
Each of these questions merit further detailed study in their own right and 
should form the core of a research agenda on the ability of the existing 
international environmental law to sustainably manage developments in 
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synthetic biology in the biotechnology sector. Further detailed analysis 
may reveal other gaps.  
As a starting point I suggest the following questions need to be examined: 
Firstly, what novel risks does synthetic biology pose to the environment 
and human health beyond those already regulated under the existing law? 
Secondly, do the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol apply to the 
products of synthetic biology? Thirdly are existing approaches to risk 
management embodied in the current law adequate for regulating 
biosafety risks associated with synthetic biology? Finally, does the 
existing law place sufficient restrictions on the development of this 
technology to prevent accidental or malicious release of synthetic 
organisms? 
A robust legal analysis should also consider what other sources of 
international environmental law (including existing treaty regimes, 
customary international law and soft law) are relevant to regulating 
synthetic biology. It is from that point that we can then go on to examine 
what options there are for addressing these gaps.  
Beyond the academic literature debate is beginning to emerge within the 
forums of the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol as to the adequacy of 
these instruments to respond to both the opportunities and emerging 
concerns relating to synthetic biology.
48
 Synthetic biology was first 
considered by the Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and 
Technological Advice (SBSTTA) of the CBD at its 14
th
 meeting in 
Nairobi in 2010 when the SBSTTA formally invited Parties, other 
governments and relevant organisations to submit information on 
synthetic biology while recommending the application of ‘the 
precautionary approach to the field release of synthetic life, cell or 
genome into the environment’.
49
 The issue was subsequently discussed at 
the 16
th
 meeting of the SBSTTA in Montreal in 2012. The SBSTTA 
could not agree on a recommendation on how to proceed with the issue 
and accordingly gave three possible alternate recommendations to the 
Conference of Parties (‘COP’) of the CBD.  
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Subsequently, at its 11
th
 meeting in India in December 2012, the COP 
made a number of decisions on a way forward for consideration of 
synthetic biology within the context of the CBD. Of particular 
significance for present purposes was the fact the Executive Secretary 
was directed by the COP of the CBD to prepare a study of ‘possible gaps 
and overlaps with the applicable provisions of the [CBD], its protocols 
and other relevant agreements related to components, organisms and 
products resulting from synthetic biology techniques’ (hereinafter ‘the 
gap analysis’).
50
 The COP also resolved to invite Parties, other 
Governments and relevant international organisations, indigenous and 
local communities to submit ‘additional relevant information on 
components, organisms and products resulting from synthetic biology 
techniques that may have impacts on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity and associated social, economic and cultural 
considerations’ (hereinafter the ‘impacts analysis’).
51
 
A draft of the gap analysis and the impacts analysis was made available to 
parties of the CBD and other interested parties for peer review from July 
to September 2013. Following that peer review, a further revision of these 
studies (funded by the United Kingdom) was prepared by the Secretariat 
of the CBD in April 2014 and made available to SBSTTA.
52
 These drafts 
were considered by the SBSTA at its 18
th
 meeting in Montreal in June 
2014, and the SBSTTA recommended to the next COP of the CBD that 
the revised drafts of the gap analysis and the impacts analysis be subject 
to a further round of peer review.
53
  
A detailed review of both the gap analysis and the impacts analysis is not 
possible for the purposes of this brief note as they are embargoed and not 
available for citation as at the date of writing. But in future analysis of 
this issue, I would note in passing that these documents and their analysis 
warrant close attention. I question the extent to which some of the 
assertions and conclusions of these papers are actually justified by 
reference to analysis of the existing law. 
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Much of the debate relating to synthetic biology in the forums of the CBD 
has focussed upon whether synthetic biology is a new or emerging issue 
that parties to the CBD need to address, and it is this aspect of the issue 
which has occupied debate at both the SBSTTA and COP of the CBD 
over the past few years.  
Most recently, at the 12
th
 Meeting of the Conference of Parties of the 
CBD held in Korea in 2014 the COP resolved that there is currently 
‘insufficient information available ….to decide whether or not [synthetic 
biology] is a new and emerging issue related to conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity.’
54
 Nonetheless the COP also resolved to 
urge parties and invite other governments to take a precautionary 
approach to synthetic biology and: 
(a) To establish, or have in place, effective risk assessment and 
management procedures and/or regulatory systems to regulate 
environmental release of any organisms, components or products 
resulting from synthetic biology techniques, consistent with Article 
3 of the Convention; 
(b) To approve organisms resulting from synthetic biology techniques 
for field trials only after appropriate risk assessments have been 
carried out in accordance with national, regional and/or international 
frameworks, as appropriate; 
(c) To carry out scientific assessments concerning organisms, 
components and products resulting from synthetic biology 
techniques with regard to potential effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity, taking into account risks to human 
health and addressing, as appropriate, and according to national 
and/or regional legislation, other issues such as food security and 
socioeconomic considerations with, where appropriate, the full 
participation of indigenous and local communities; 
(d) To encourage the provision of funding for research into synthetic 
biology risk assessment methodologies and into the positive and 
negative impacts of synthetic biology on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity, and to promote interdisciplinary 
research that includes related socioeconomic considerations; 
(e) To cooperate in the development and/or strengthening of human 
resources and institutional capacities, including on methodologies 
for risk assessments in synthetic biology and its potential impacts on 
biodiversity, in developing countries, in particular the least 
developed countries and small island developing States, and 
countries with economies in transition, including through existing 
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global, regional and national institutions and organizations and, as 
appropriate, by facilitating civil society involvement. The needs of 
developing country Parties, in particular the least developed 
countries and small island developing States among them, and 
Parties with economies in transition, for financial resources; access 
to and transfer of technology consistent with Article 16 of the 
Convention; establishing or strengthening regulatory frameworks; 
and the management of risks related to the release of organisms, 
components and products resulting from synthetic biology 
techniques, should be taken fully into account in this regard.
55
 
Perhaps more significantly the COP also agreed to establish an Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group composed of indigenous and local communities 
and all relevant stakeholders, including other Governments, with 
knowledge of the Convention and its Protocols with the following terms 
of reference: 
(a) Take note of the exchange of views on how to address the 
relationship between synthetic biology and biological diversity; 
(b) Identify the similarities and differences between living modified 
organisms (as defined in the Cartagena Protocol) and organisms, 
components and products of synthetic biology techniques to 
determine if living modified organisms derived from synthetic 
biology fall under the scope of the Cartagena Protocol; 
(c) Identify if other national, regional and/or international instruments 
adequately regulate the organisms, components or products derived 
from synthetic biology techniques in so far as they impact on the 
objectives of the Convention and its Protocols; 
(d) Work towards an operational definition of synthetic biology, 
comprising inclusion and exclusion criteria, using all relevant 
information, based on scientific and peer-reviewed studies; 
(e) Identify the potential benefits and risks of organisms, components 
and products arising from synthetic biology techniques to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and related human 
health and socioeconomic impacts relevant to the mandate of the 
Convention and its Protocols; 
(f) Building on the work on risk assessment and risk management 
undertaken by the Cartagena Protocol, compile information on best 
practices on risk assessment and monitoring regimes currently used 
by Parties to the Convention and other Governments, including 
transboundary movement, to inform those who do not have national 
risk assessment or monitoring regimes, or are in the process of 
reviewing their current risk assessment or monitoring regimes and to 
help those Parties and other Governments to regulate organisms, 
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components and products from synthetic biology techniques 
appropriately; 
(g) Identify if the existing arrangements constitute a comprehensive 
framework in order to address impacts of organisms, components 
and products resulting from synthetic biology relevant to the 
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its 




While not yet formally recognised as a new emerging issue by the COP of 
the CBD, it is nonetheless clear from the terms of reference of the Ad hoc 
experts group that it is recognised by State Parties that this is an issue 
meriting robust and detailed consideration by the international 
community over coming years. Any future research by scholars of 
international environmental law on these questions would be useful to 
inform debate at the forums of the CBD. 
VI RESPONDING TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One of the contemporary challenges for international environmental law 
is how it has become fragmented and disconnected from other areas of 
international law.
57
 International environmental law has increasingly been 
regarded by practitioners, academics and policy makers alike as a discrete 
body of law separate from other areas such as, for example international 
trade law or human rights law. But this failure to recognise linkages with 




While synthetic biology poses new challenges for international 
environmental law, it is clear that we cannot just consider this an issue 
relating to international environmental law alone and the challenges of 
fragmentation need to be kept in mind as international environmental law 
relating to synthetic biology is developed. 
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For present purposes, the most significant area that needs to be 
considered is international law relevant to bioterrorism. The dual use 
nature of synthetic biology means that as well as creating new biological 
structures or organisms for beneficial purposes such as new drugs or 
biofuels, it also has significant potential use for terrorist purposes. This 
potential has already been demonstrated with the synthesis of several 
pathogenic viruses, such as an infectious poliovirus and a synthetic form 
of the virus responsible for the 1918 influenza pandemic.
59
  
The availability of DNA sequence data and molecular biology techniques 
on the internet, along with the fact that specially synthesized DNA can 
easily be purchased from specialised companies, make it possible for 
actors with malevolent intent to engineer a virus that could be used in a 
terrorist attack.
60
 Beyond deliberate acts of terrorism, as biology 
increasingly becomes influenced by engineering or informational 
approaches it has also been suggested it will not be long before computer 
scientists and/or hackers could turn their interest to synthetic biology.
61
 
Given the implications of synthetic biology for bioterrorism it is 
important therefore that any future developments in international 
environmental law be informed by international and national legal 
developments relating to bio-terrorism. The focus of ongoing and future 
developments in relation to synthetic biology in the forums of the CBD 
will not be on bioterrorism and dual use per se, but options for 
international environmental law reform in relation to the biosafety, 
human health and biodiversity implications of synthetic biology will need 
to be nested in an understanding of the concerns surrounding the dual use 
implications of the technology. 
In the field of bio-terrorism law the most important developments have 
taken place in the context of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (‘BTW 
Convention’).
62
 The BTW Convention bans the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition and retention of microbial or other biological 
agents or toxins, in types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
63
 Pursuant to the 
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BTW Convention, States are required to legislate to prohibit and prevent 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery banned under 
the BTW Convention, within their territory, jurisdiction or control.
64
 
Operating in parallel to the BTW Convention the so-called ‘Australia 
Group’ of countries is an informal association of countries that aim to 
minimize the risk of further proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapons.
65 In 2008, the Australia Group agreed to form a synthetic 
biology advisory body to keep informed of developments in relation to 
synthetic biology relevant to its non-proliferation mandate, and the work 
of that advisory body is ongoing. So far, there is little published or 
publicly available information on the work of the Australia Group. 
However, to the extent that national security constraints might permit, it 
would be useful for ongoing consideration of the adequacy of 
international environmental law to be informed by the work and analysis 
of the Australia Group in relation to synthetic biology. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Synthetic biology clearly shows great promise for future developments in 
biotechnology. However, there are great risks too. There is an urgent need 
for closer examination of the implications of synthetic biology for 
international environmental law and in particular the CBD and the 
Cartagena Protocol. This article has outlined the emerging debates at the 
forums associated with the CBD and has highlighted numerous issues that 
need further examination by scholars and practitioners of international 
environmental law. The speed at which synthetic biology is transforming 
the biotechnology industry lends some urgency to the task at hand. While 
recent developments at the CBD are encouraging, like so many new 
frontiers of science in the past, law, and international environmental law 
in particular, is slow in coming to terms with the challenges of this 
revolutionary technology.  
Developing new law or making old law fit for new challenges is never 
easy, but the potential risks of this technology in particular mandate an 
urgent assessment of the capacity of international environmental law to 
respond to the biosafety risks, risks to human health and the environment 
posed by synthetic biology. The potential opportunities this technology 
offers humanity should also be recognised and a reasonable balance be 
struck between the risks and the rewards of the synthetic biology 
revolution. 
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